decision, 9 which the historian John Ramsden contends 'did turn out rather well'. 10 Home's succession to the premiership in October 1963 strengthens this case.
Home's relationship with his Prime Minister has received little attention, although there is general agreement that he was 'a perfect foil for Macmillan's showmanship'. 11 His integrity, shrewdness, judgement and willingness to say unpopular things compensated for Macmillan's impetuousness. D. R. Thorpe highlights Home's role as a source of advice and reassurance to the Prime Minister, especially after Macmillan replaced a large chunk of his Cabinet in July 1962. 12 There is less consensus on who controlled foreign policy. One group of authors attributes primacy to the Prime Minister. According to his biographer, Macmillan was 'his own Foreign Secretary (certainly on all the major issues)' 13 and John P. S. Gearson agrees that Macmillan's 'position was unchallenged in the field of foreign affairs'. 14 Home's Foreign Office colleagues support this. To them, Home was not inclined to seek the limelight and was happy to concentrate on other areas. 15 In contrast, another school holds that Macmillan believed in delegation and non-interference. 16 As John Dickie put it 'The Prime Minister was never a meddler in the running of the Foreign Office during Lord Home's term of office'. 17 Lord Kilmuir concurred, asserting that with Home's appointment, 'The Foreign Office, which had virtually been under the personal direction of the Prime Minister since 1955, once again began to function as it should do'. 18 It is difficult to disentangle Home's role from Macmillan's other than through a close examination of archival sources. Using such an approach, this article sheds light on this important area by addressing two key questions. First, it analyses Home's role in Anglo-American relations, both in conversing with US representatives and shaping policy. Secondly, it examines his association with Macmillan. The three broad areas in which the 'special relationship' was most tested are analysed, covering a range of 'high' and 'low' issues. The first differences appeared in attitudes to civil wars in newly independent states, most notably Laos and the formerly Belgian Congo.
The US also opposed plans to grant British Guiana independence. Moreover, divergences were present over the Cold War 'hot-spots' of Berlin and Cuba. Finally, disagreements over nuclear weapons will be considered. Relations became strained over nuclear co-operation with third parties, the US cancellation of the Skybolt Eden (1955) (1956) (1957) and Macmillan (1957 Macmillan ( -1960 found himself permanently overshadowed by prime ministerial intervention in foreign policy matters. Three key themes emerge from this literature: personality clashes, prime ministerial interference in foreign policy and a sometimes uneasy division of responsibilities. Personal friction is most apparent in the first two of the above cases. Curzon 'brought out the spiteful side of Lloyd George's nature' 19 and the Prime Minister often attacked and denigrated him in Cabinet. There was also unpleasantness between MacDonald and Henderson.
MacDonald 'sniped at the Foreign Secretary's lack of competence, hamstrung his initiatives, and maligned him in the presence of politicians and trade union leaders'. 20 Prime ministerial interference in foreign affairs often exacerbated these personality clashes. MacDonald set a trend days after coming to power when, as the FO was attempting to improve Anglo-French relations, he authorised a Sunday Times article criticising France for her treatment of minorities. 21 43 The use of force raised even greater concerns. 44 Anglo-American differences first surfaced in the summer of 1961. In
December, The Times commented that 'It is becoming increasingly apparent that Anglo-American differences in the conduct of Congo policy are as serious as any since the Suez crisis'. 45 The Foreign Secretary frankly encouraged Rusk to change policy. 46 The first disagreement centred on the cost of operations in the Congo. Home considered withdrawing funds, but thought that the US would still contribute and worried that the USSR might step in. On a visit to Washington, he asked Kennedy 'how much longer the United States and the United Kingdom were going to keep on paying the bill without calling the tune a little more'. 47 The Foreign Secretary became increasingly disillusioned with the United Nations. He viewed the UN as a peace keeping body and argued that it 'cannot take over the task of government in these huge and unruly countries where the primary task for years ahead will be to prevent civil war'. 48 As Bundy astutely observed, Britain 'seemed to feel that the UN was a damned nuisance'.
49
The issue of economic sanctions was even more contentious. Home 'expressed flat opposition to sanctions', warning that they would have 'disastrous effects'. 50 When the US persisted and pressured the UN to propose a boycott of Katangan copper, Britain refused to adhere, suspicious because much of the world's copper was in American hands. 51 She continued to distance herself from tougher schemes and remained resolute at the Anglo-US-Belgian talks, much to the State Department's displeasure. The Foreign Secretary's main concern, however, was to prevent the use of force. He was reluctant to back a resolution on the Congo, fearing that the UN might use it to impose its will on Katanga, 52 Office accepted the decision, noting 'that the deciding factor must be … the risks of wider damage to Anglo-American cooperation'. 95 The US then agreed to supply
France with a complete Nautilus nuclear powered submarine. Macmillan fumed, but
Home again prioritised preventing a row with the Americans. 96 The pattern repeated itself when US pressure on Foster Wheeler's parent company resulted in the rejection of a further French proposal. 97 A similar situation occurred when Israel approached Britain to supply her with Hawk missiles after the US refused to do so. The Foreign Secretary counselled against the sale. His main concern was the US, 'since our own anti-aircraft missiles involve
American information and we should need their permission to sell the weapons to Israel'. 98 No deal was done, but the Americans then changed their minds without fulfilling their promise to consult Britain. Macmillan was more furious than ever, warning Kennedy, without objection from Home, that 'It certainly makes it necessary to reconsider our whole position on this and allied matters'. 99 The response of Lord
Hood, Minister at the Embassy in Washington, suggests that the Foreign Secretary's reputation as a restraint was well known. Hood noted that Kennedy was yet to read
Macmillan's message, and asked Home to prompt the Prime Minister to send a second more conciliatory one. 100 Macmillan obliged.
Further tension arose when, in November 1962, the US finally cancelled the air-launched Skybolt missile, promised to Britain in 1960 to act as her independent nuclear deterrent. Of course, 'Britain had become so reliant on the Americans that the concept of an "independent nuclear deterrent" was nonsense', 101 Macmillan's hand by allowing him to present ideas as a joint approach. As usual,
Home was more conciliatory towards the Americans. When Thorneycroft wanted to leave Nassau early, the Foreign Secretary sided with Ormsby-Gore against him. Home also contributed by telling Kennedy that a deal 'would have absolutely no effect on the French' and could strengthen support for the Multilateral Force (MLF). 107 The MLF plan envisaged placing nuclear weapons under joint control. Its advantages were political, combining the British and French nuclear programmes and curtailing German nuclear aspirations by involving her in nuclear policy. However, 'From a military standpoint, M.L.F. was a complete nonsense'. 108 Macmillan warned
Kennedy in June 1963 that Britain opposed the idea. He also thought associating Germany with nuclear weapons would do great damage to détente. Furthermore, whilst Britain would surrender her entire nuclear arsenal, the Americans would only share control of those in Europe. 109 Home appeared supportive of the plan at first. In [Home] and not to any of the others'. 118 As negotiations developed, Home's diplomacy constituted a valuable contribution to the Treaty. He worked patiently throughout the summer of 1962 to persuade the US to put a fresh offer to the USSR, which they finally tabled in August.
He pressed the US to be more specific and later dissented from 'putting forward at this stage other detailed proposals which have no scientific justification'. 119 Having successfully opposed the US wish to suspend the Geneva Conference, Home even ensured some changes were made in the draft itself. 120 Moreover, the Foreign However, Britain did benefit from her high levels of access to the US. This enabled policy-makers to counsel against measures with which they disagreed. Sometimes, as on Laos, they were successful. Other times they were not, but at least they were heard.
Arguably Britain's greatest benefit came in the defence arena when Macmillan secured Polaris on very favourable terms. From the American perspective, Britain proved to be a loyal friend. This was most notable during the Cuban missile crisis, where personal contacts were especially important. Macmillan provided reassurance to Kennedy, whilst Ormsby-Gore suggested that the blockade be placed closer to the coast to give the Soviets more time to think. By working with Britain over British Guiana, and exploiting her leverage over her, the US was able to ensure that Jagan did not emerge as leader of the newly independent state. Here, like elsewhere, Britain acted to support the US in spite of disagreeing with her. The special relationship thus brought benefits for both parties between 1961 and 1963. Lord Home's contribution to it was of central importance.
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